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LONG ABSTRACT 
Natural selection is often represented as one of the main causal mechanisms driving evolution, 
and is often modeled in biology textbooks as some kind of Newtonian force, with magnitude and 
direction. However, this picture is complicated when one takes into consideration how evolution 
by natural selection is constituted by individual births and deaths. Following a number of articles 
by Walsh, Ariew and Matthen, there is now a significant challenge that natural selection may not 
even be a cause, let alone a Newtonian force. Individual births and deaths can be described 
independently of natural selection. Natural selection is no causal propensity over and above 
individual-level processes; rather, it is a statistical effect, a mere book-keeping of the genuinely 
causal interactions that take place between individual organisms (Matthen and Ariew 2009; 
Walsh, Lewens and Ariew 2002; Walsh 2007). 
In the extensive literature that has ensued, the statisticalist approach has mainly been used to 
argue for a deflationary position “fitness and natural selection have no reality except as 
accumulations of more fundamental events” (Matthen and Ariew 2002, 82). In this paper I will to 
investigate the underexplored possibility of a non-deflationary statisticalist analysis of selection. 
This adopts the statisticalist, bottom-up analysis of population change, but tries to reconcile it 
with certain causalist intuitions. The inspiration for this is that, while statisticalist considerations 
may preclude certain naïve ways of understanding the causal nature of selection, causalist 
intuitions cannot be entirely wrong either. At the very least, it cannot be denied that most of 
biological practise is not threatened by these considerations. While it may be metaphysically 
inacccurate, it is often empirically accurate to model selection as a causal force (for example in 
cases of stabilizing selection, where component pressures cancel out). This suggests that 
causalist intuitions must be legitimate in some way. 
My approach in this paper will be to use the notion of equilibrium as a way of understanding 
how the causal nature of selection can be real, thus grounding causalist intuitions. Equilibrium is 
a central concept in modeling the behavior of complex systems. In particular, stable equilibria 
are empirically important because they act as attractors and allow for a long-term prediction of 
the behavior of the system, even though the behavior in the middle-term may be chaotic and too 
complex to calculate. However, they are also philosophically important as they can allow a well-
defined direction to be assigned to a complex process. Thus a concept of directionality can be 
formulated that is grounded in a statistics of individual-level dynamics and that allows us to 
understand why natural selection can be legitimately called causal.  
To establish such a framework, I will need to do three things. The first task will be to lay the 
ground by disentangling some different notions of causality at play, in particular process and 
difference-making causality. Each highlights a different aspect of natural selection and confusion 
results if these are not kept separate. In this paper I will focus on difference-making causality 
alone, mainly because this notion has been more controversial. Difference-making is, broadly, 
counterfactual dependence. The statisticalist arguments have endeavored to show that, even if 
natural selection were not present, evolutionary change would occur. 
One argument has been that natural selection is established only retroactively, by a statistical 
regression on actually occurred births and deaths (where selection is the correlation between 
traits and births). There is no description-independent way of establishing fitness or natural 
selection (and this is related to the reference class problem). Another argument has concerned the 
inseparability of natural selection from the causal processes affecting the behavior of organisms. 
The probabilities that characterize the possible outcomes by natural selection are only a measure 
of our ignorance of the individual-level processes determining the births and deaths. They do not 
correspond to any putative ‘causal propensity’ that could be used to ground natural selection. 
The second task will be to formulate the condition of equilibrium, and to show how, if it is 
accepted, it can resolve certain key issues regarding difference-making causality. For this I will 
use an extension of the Price equation to the multigenerational case. The Price equation gives an 
exact relationship between the phenotype distribution of different generations:  
!  
where  is the phenotype variable of the kth generation,  a measure for how 
relative fitness !  covaries with phenotype ! , and !  the expected transmission bias. 
I will show how this equation can be simplified considerably under assumption that an 
equilibrium is reached after a certain number of generations. This assumption then allows one to 
uniquely define a direction of an evolutionary process: the tendency towards equilibrium.  
This is important because it allows one to argue that the probabilities defining fitness are not 
purely description-dependent. Neither is natural selection merely a measure of subjective 
uncertainty; rather, it reveals an objective feature of certain evolutionary processes, namely the 
presence of stable equilibrium. Natural selection is causal in the difference-making sense: if it 
were not present, an evolution towards stable equilibrium would not be observed. 
Finally I will need to argue why the equilibrium condition is a plausible assumption. To this end, 
I will show that given evolutionary change, either a stable equilibrium is reached, or if it is not, 
then the concept of fitness is not meaningful. I discuss certain results from Markov process 
literature, where the conditions for equilibrium are established (Doeblin’s theorem). From this it 
can be seen that the notion of equilibrium is intertwined with natural selection, and that this is a 
natural way to reconcile both statisticalist and causalist approaches.  
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z (k+1) − z (k ) = Cov(ω (k ), z(k+1) )+ E[z(k+1) − z(k ) ],
z(k ) Cov(ω (k ), z(k+1) )
ω z E[z(k+1) − z(k ) ]
